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Summary
On November 21-22, 2005, the United States will host a meeting with Bosnia’s
collective leadership to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Dayton accords, an
agreement brokered under U.S. leadership that ended the 1992-1995 conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Since early 2005, the Bush Administration has given renewed emphasis
to “unfinished business” in the western Balkan region, such as the unresolved status of
Kosovo, a U.N.-run province of Serbia.  The United States also seeks to bolster Bosnia’s
further development as a unified, democratic, and stable state on the path toward Euro-
Atlantic integration, including major constitutional reforms. This report provides an
overview of prominent current issues concerning Bosnia and will be updated after the
10th anniversary meeting in Washington.  For further background information, see CRS
Report RL32392, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issues for U.S. Policy, by Steven Woehrel.
Introduction and U.S. Policy
The Dayton peace agreement,1 reached in November 1995 with U.S. leadership,
ended a brutal three and one-half year ethnic and territorial conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina that erupted after the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia.  The Dayton
agreement outlined a common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of two entities,
the Bosniak (Muslim)-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska (RS), under the
authority of an international administration and a NATO-led peacekeeping presence.
Central Bosnian governmental institutions include a three-member Presidency, Prime
Minister and Council of Ministers, and bicameral state Parliament. Under Dayton, central
governing powers were kept weak, with many governing functions remaining at the
Federation and RS entity level, which have their own governments and parliaments.
Below the entity level are cantons and municipalities in the Federation and municipalities
only in the RS.  At the international level, the Dayton-mandated Office of the High
Representative (OHR) oversees international activities in Bosnia and has authority to
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impose decisions and remove officials.  As the security situation improved, NATO
gradually reduced its presence in Bosnia and turned over peacekeeping duties to the
European Union (EU) in December 2004.
Most observers agree that Dayton was a great achievement in that it ended the war
and laid the foundation for consolidating peace. However, many observers also believe
that the Dayton agreement, as a document derived from compromises and reflecting
wartime circumstances, cannot by itself insure Bosnia’s future as a functioning
democratic state.2  In particular, Bosnia’s Dayton-mandated state structures have
presented challenges to its efforts to integrate into the European Union and NATO.  At
the November 21-22, 2005, meeting in Washington, the Bush Administration will seek
to highlight further tasks and hurdles for the Bosnian leadership to undertake and
overcome.  However, achieving consensus among Bosnia’s political leaders may prove
difficult on many of these issues, especially those involving vested political interests.
Bosnia will face critical national elections in October 2006.
Since early 2005, the Bush Administration has given renewed emphasis to
addressing “unfinished business” in the western Balkan region in conjunction with
European Union efforts.  A major thrust of U.S. policy concerns addressing the
unresolved status of Kosovo, a U.N.-run province of Serbia that seeks independence.  The
United States also seeks to bolster Bosnia’s further development as a unified, democratic,
and stable state on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration.  The Administration
supports Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations but believes that Bosnia must first consolidate
its state structures and erase the ethnic and political divisions that Dayton accommodated.
State Consolidation
As noted above, the Bush Administration and the EU seek to promote further
constitutional reform to improve the governing effectiveness of Bosnia’s political
institutions and overcome some of the dysfunctional aspects of the post-Dayton legacy.
Among other things, a stronger Bosnian state could contribute to greater self-sufficiency
in Bosnia’s peaceful and democratic development, an improved ability to address pressing
political and economic concerns including combating organized criminal and international
terrorist activity, and improved prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration.  In March 2005,
the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission concluded that Bosnia’s current
constitutional arrangements were neither efficient nor rational, and that state-level
institutions needed to become far more effective for Bosnia to move closer to EU
integration.3
In particular, U.S. Administration officials have identified priority changes to
Bosnia’s state-level governing institutions to include: creating a single Presidency instead
of the current tri-partite Presidency; strengthening the Prime Minister’s office; and
strengthening the Bosnian Parliament.  U.S. officials claim that such reforms will
represent a logical evolution of the Dayton agreement and an extension of several recent
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landmark reforms. In addition, U.S. experts have been working with Bosnian politicians
on a new draft constitution that would transform many of the Dayton political structures.4
The recent milestone political and economic reforms reached by Bosnia’s state and
entity institutions, often with extensive input from and pressure by the international
community, have given impetus to the U.S. and EU reform initiative.  After numerous
delays, the Bosnian entities recently agreed on EU-driven police reforms that will give
legislative and budgetary authority to central Bosnian institutions, although aspects of
implementation will stretch out five years.  Earlier in the year, the Bosnian parties agreed
to defense and security reforms that will eventually merge the formerly rival forces into
an army controlled by the central government.5  Earlier agreements on intelligence and
information services, state prosecution offices and justice ministry, and border and
customs services, among others, have steadily expanded central state competencies and
institutions. 
In spite of these agreements, the broad effort to institute constitutional reforms has
remained controversial.  Some observers have called for the High Representative to use
his authority to push through whatever measures are necessary to consolidate reforms.
However, international officials have resisted going so far as to abolish the entity structure
or ban specific political parties such as the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the party
most resistant to state-building efforts (but still popular). In any case, the High
Representative’s powers are expected to be curtailed in the near term (see below). Some
Bosnian Serb representatives have opposed changes that would eliminate the entity
structure, which they say is enshrined in the Dayton accords.  Their concerns about the
viability of the RS contributed to their extended opposition to overhauling and unifying
the police.  In addition, some ethnic Croat parties have promoted the idea of a third Croat
entity.  
The timing and duration of further change is also an open question, especially with
the next elections scheduled for early October 2006.  Moreover, some observers believe
that major constitutional changes should not be imposed from the outside, but should
come about through domestic political processes and in a gradual, incremental fashion.6
Euro-Atlantic Integration
Along with the other western Balkan states, Bosnia and Herzegovina seeks eventual
full membership in the European Union and NATO.  Both institutions have committed
to the region’s full integration, once various conditions have been met.  In recent years,
however, Bosnia has found itself more isolated from international organizations than most
of its neighboring states. 
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European Union.  At its June 2003 Thessaloniki summit, the EU committed to
integrate all of the countries of the western Balkans and created new instruments to foster
closer ties to the EU, including the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the
first step toward eventual EU accession.  The European Commission concluded a
Feasibility Study for the SAA in late 2003 and outlined 16 priority tasks for Bosnia to
achieve prior to opening SAA negotiations, mainly dealing with the capacity of state
institutions.  Delays in implementing reforms and limited RS cooperation on war crimes
issues (see below) held up further progress.  
In the past year, the EU has especially emphasized the need for Bosnia to implement
reforms in the defense and security sector, including reforms regarding the police and
public broadcasting.  Transferring controls over the police from the entity level to the
central government proved to be the most difficult obstacle to overcome, as RS leaders
remained opposed to the loss of this vital institution and support structure. The RS
Parliament repeatedly rejected EU proposals to unify and reorganize police structures
across entity lines.  Finally in early October, the EU and RS came to a compromise
agreement that adhered to EU principles on state-level control over the police, but
postponed decisions on a number of related disputed items. With these hurdles largely
cleared, the EU approved the start of SAA negotiations, which are likely to open in
December 2005.  The RS position shift may partly be attributed to concerns that Bosnia
could “miss the boat” on EU integration, especially as neighboring states are making
progress on this front, and as it appears that EU enthusiasm for further enlargement could
be waning. 
NATO.  Along with Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia is the only former Yugoslav state
that has not yet joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. As noted above,
Bosnia’s government agreed to sweeping defense reforms in 2004 and 2005 to unify the
armed forces structure and command and to create a professional military.  With these
achievements on transforming the armed forces, the only remaining hurdle to Bosnia’s
PFP aspirations is the RS’ still incomplete cooperation with The Hague war crimes
tribunal, especially with regard to arresting fugitive war crimes suspects. A small, residual
NATO presence in Sarajevo has provided the Bosnian government with advice and
assistance on defense reform issues, and is also engaged in efforts to capture and detain
remaining war criminals. 
ICTY Cooperation7
Full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
has been a major precondition for closer association with the EU and NATO.  With regard
to Bosnia, the Office of the Prosecutor at ICTY has indicated that cooperation with the
Bosnian Federation has been fully satisfactory over the past few years, while cooperation
with the RS has not.  Until January 2005, RS authorities had not arrested a single indicted
war crimes suspect. Several suspects have since been turned over to The Hague,
especially by Serbia; however, Serbia’s and the RS’ levels of cooperation with ICTY have
been judged to be insufficient, primarily because of their inability or unwillingness to
locate and arrest former Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko
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Mladic, both of whom are thought to be located (at least intermittently) in Serbia and
Montenegro or in the RS.8  While this status did not hold up the start of SAA talks with
the EU for both Serbia and Bosnia, EU officials have made clear that much further
progress in the talks cannot be expected while the top war crimes suspects remain
fugitives.  Similarly, the United States has insisted on their capture before either state can
join NATO’s PFP program.
International Role
The international community has played a dominant role in Bosnian affairs since
1995.  Ten years on, the international security presence has been radically reduced,
although still considered essential.  The extensive political authority of the Office of the
High Representative has become increasingly controversial and that office is expected
soon to undergo significant changes.  
Office of the High Representative.  Successive High Representatives have
frequently exercised considerable executive power, under the so-called “Bonn powers”
authority, to break through political stalemates, push difficult reforms forward, and even
remove obstructionist leaders.9  The current High Representative, Lord Paddy Ashdown,
has freely wielded his powers during his tenure, making binding decisions and taking
action against or removing officials thought to support Radovan Karadzic.  While an
effective mechanism, the High Representative’s office has come under increasing
criticism for allegedly stymieing the political development of Bosnia’s leaders.  Ashdown
is set to complete his term as High Representative at the end of 2005, and a successor has
not yet been named. As Ashdown serves simultaneously as the EU’s Special
Representative in Bosnia, some experts speculate that the EU could take over for the
institution of the High Representative. Some have called for the entire office to be phased
out after the October 2006 elections, and as Bosnia’s central governing institutions are
developed and strengthened.  Should Bosnia continue to make progress toward eventual
EU integration, some observers (including Lord Ashdown) believe that the EU accession
process, with its comprehensive and stringent political, economic, and legal requirements,
will provide its own impetus for sustainable reforms.
EUFOR/NATO Headquarters.  At the end of 2004, NATO concluded its SFOR
mission in Bosnia and turned over peacekeeping duties to a European Union military
force, EUFOR, to ensure continued compliance with Dayton and contribute to a secure
environment in Bosnia.  EUFOR has a strength of about 7,000 troops.  NATO maintains
a small headquarters presence in Sarajevo that provides assistance to the Bosnian
government and undertakes counter-terrorism and intelligence operations and missions
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to detain indicted war criminals.  The NATO presence includes a small contingent of U.S.
forces.10
The EU also took over the U.N. police monitoring and advisory mission in 2003.
The EU Police Mission in Bosnia comprises about 500 international police officers.  Its
mandate is set to expire in early 2006.
